One of the most debated issues in monetary economics concerns the impact of monetary policy on the term structure of interest rates. Approaching this issue from the perspective of monetary policy rules seems promising because long-term interest rates depend on expectations of future short-term rates, which are determined by the response of the central bank to future developments in the economy, a response most easily captured by a policy rule.
In this paper we investigate how shifts in the central bank's policy rule cause shifts in the term structure of interest rates. We focus on a new representation of the term structure in which long-term interest rates are related to inflation and output, much as a monetary policy rule describes how the short-term interest rate is related to inflation and output. The term structure is thus simply a series of implied "policy rules" for long-term interest rates-one policy rule for each maturity-with "response coefficients" measuring the size of the interest rate reaction. We find that these implied policy rules are very useful for understanding the impact of monetary policy because longer-term interest rates have powerful effects on spending and asset allocation decisions not captured by short-term interest rates.
To begin our analysis, we empirically document a dramatic secular shift over the last several decades in the size of the response coefficients of long-term interest rates to inflation and output in the United States. One important characteristic of this shift is that an increase in inflation has been associated with a larger rise in long-term interest rates in the decades since the mid 1980s than in the 1960s and 1970s. Another is that long-term interest rates have been responding more to real output fluctuations. We then show that a theory of monetary policy based on policy rules can explain and help understand this empirical finding. Using no-arbitrage pricing methods developed by Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2005) , we derive analytically an equation relating the response coefficients in the implied long-term interest rate rules to the response coefficients of the short-term interest rate rule of the central bank. This equation takes risk premia into account and reveals two countervailing effects of shifts in the policy rule on the long-term yield equations. By differentiating this equation with respect to the response coefficients in the monetary policy rule, we derive our main result: a secular shift in the monetary policy rule in the mid 1980s in United States explains the large shift in the term structure. Previous work exploring the impacts of monetary policy rule shifts on longer-term interest rates by Fuhrer (1996) used the pure expectations model of the term structure and thus did not examine these longer-term response coefficients. 
The Response Coefficients
We consider a representation of the term structure in which long-term interest rates are linear functions of macroeconomic variables. The specific objects of our investigation are the slopes of these linear functions, which we refer to as the response coefficients, because they describe how yields on bonds of different maturities respond to macroeconomic developments.
These response coefficients are not individual behavioral parameters; rather they represent the interaction of all participants in the bond markets and other parts of the economy. We are interested in the term structure pattern of these response coefficients and how they change over time. We focus on the responses to two macroeconomic variables-inflation and the real GDP gap-because these are the two variables that are most important in short-term interest rate rules that describe the behavior of central banks.
The simplest linear function occurs when long term rates depend only on inflation and a random error term. Letting ) (n t i be the yield to maturity on bonds with maturity n, we then have:
where t π is the inflation rate and η t is an error term. The coefficients n a are the intercepts and the coefficients n b are the response coefficients for maturities n = 1,…, N. Clearly, the sizes of n b are important for the overall behavior of the economy. If the n b are large, then an increase in inflation will bring about an increase in the yields on bonds with those maturities and thereby affect spending by firms or consumers who are borrowing funds at those maturities. A very small value of the response coefficients-say less than one-could lead to such a small increase in yields that the real interest rate (computed with an expected inflation rate corresponding to the maturity of the bonds) could fall with an increase in inflation and thereby exacerbate the rise in inflation. 1960Q1 -1979Q4 and 1984Q1 -2006Q4 . The zero-coupon bond yields are quarterly averages of monthly CRSP data on U.S. Treasury yields at one-through five-year maturities. We choose these maturities since they are the available maturities in the CRSP database that have been converted to zero-coupon yields. The inflation measure is the four-quarter moving average of the percentage change of the U.S. GDP chainweighted price index. Figure 1 depicts the pattern of the coefficients graphically.
Note the dramatic secular shift in these coefficients between the two sample periods. For all maturities, the response coefficients are much larger in the second period than in the first period. There is little or no tendency for the coefficients to decline with maturity in either period;
tests of the null hypothesis that the coefficients are equal at all maturities cannot be rejected for either period. The regressions reported in Tables 1 and 2 only go out to a maturity of five years because of CRSP data availability for zero-coupon Treasury yields. To help assess how longer-term yields might respond, we also estimated equations (1) and (2) using monthly Constant Maturity Treasury (CMT) yields averaged to create a quarterly series for each of the one-, three-, five-, ten-, and twenty-year bond yields. The CMT yields are estimated with a cubic spline which approximates the zero-coupon yields used in (1) and (2), thereby enabling us to examine how the longer-term yields respond to inflation and output. We obtained the CMT data from the FRED database of the St. Louis Federal Reserve Bank. Tables 3 and 4 report the estimated regressions
(1) and (2), respectively, using the CMT yields. We see a similar pattern occurring with the CMT yields as with the zero-coupon yields; the second sub-sample has higher response coefficients for the macro variables, even if we go out as far as twenty years. For the shorter maturities the estimated coefficients with CMT yields are almost identical to those with the zero-coupon yields. It should be noted that the twenty-year yield is not available for 1987Q1 -1993Q3, thus slightly reducing the accuracy of the estimates of the response coefficients for the second sub-sample. and 1984Q1 are included in the second sample. We have chosen the early-to mid-1980s as a break point because it is around that period that many researchers have documented a regime 1 We performed similar regressions using the Treasury yield curve derived in Gurkaynak, Sack, and Wright (2006) . The empirical shift is robust across these zero-coupon bond yields, and the quantitative difference between the reported coefficient estimates and those using this new zero-coupon bond data is extremely small. change in monetary policy. The change occurred around the time that Paul Volcker began to pursue a different approach to monetary policy, and has lasted for the next two decades under his successors. Clarida, Gali, and Gertler (2000) , Taylor (1999) , and Woodford (2003) The reaction coefficient on inflation is less than one in the first sub-sample and shifted to a value substantially greater than one in the second sub-sample. The reaction coefficient on output also shows a much greater responsiveness in the second period.
The obvious question is whether this change in the monetary policy response coefficients can explain the changes in the entire term structure of response coefficients. In the next two sections, we introduce a simple model and use it to derive an equation that shows that there is indeed an intimate connection between the policy rule and the term structure that helps us explain and understand the empirical results for the term structure.
The Case where the Monetary Policy Rule Depends Only On Inflation
We begin with a model that enables us to derive a simple equation relating the response coefficient on inflation in equation (1) to the central bank's policy rule coefficients. In this model, the central bank responds to inflation, but not to output. Hence, as we will show, longterm interest rates also respond to inflation, but not independently to output, so that the model implies a relationship of the form of equation (1). The model has the following equations: (3) is the monetary policy rule in which the shortterm nominal interest rate r t depends on the inflation rate with a policy response coefficient δ > 0. Equation (4) gives the yield to maturity of a zero-coupon bond with a face value of 1, where
is the price of the bond at time t. Equation (5) is a no-arbitrage condition showing that the price of an n+1 period bond at time t must equal the expected present discounted value of the price of an n period bond at time t+1, where m t is the stochastic discount factor (or pricing kernel). Equation (6) describes this stochastic discount factor, which has the convenient functional form used in the affine term structure literature. Equation (7) shows that the risk term λ t in equation (6) depends on two coefficients: γ 0 , which represents a constant risk premium, and γ 1 , which represents the time-varying risk premium attributed to changes in inflation. As we will
show the more positive is γ 1 , the more long-term yields respond positively to shocks in inflation.
Finally, equation (8) describes how monetary policy affects inflation. It is a price adjustment equation in which the change in inflation depends on the lagged real interest rate, which we simply assume depends on the ex-post real interest rate through the parameter φ > 0.
The affine term structure equations (4) through (7) are simplifications of assumptions in Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2005) . These authors also assume that macroeconomic variables (π in this simple model) evolve according to an autoregression, which does not depend on the policy rule. To answer the questions posed here about the impact of regime shifts on the term structure, it is necessary to describe how the interest rate affects inflation, and for this reason we introduce a simple structure which assumes the interest rate transmission mechanism in equation (8). This effect would be ignored by a vector autoregression model with constant coefficients, leading to errors similar to those pointed out in the Lucas critique. It is possible, of course, to improve on equation (8) and perhaps better account for the Lucas critique by introducing, for example, a
forward-looking optimization model, or perhaps staggered price setting, but the simple form of (8) allows us to obtain analytic results and focus on the term structure relations. Examples where more complex structural models have been combined with affine models of the term structure are Bekaert, Cho, and Moreno (2005) , Rudebusch and Wu (2006) , and Gallmeyer, Hollifield, Palomino, and Zin (2007) .
Equations (3) through (8) (4), we know that the price of the one-period bond at time t+1 is simply ), exp( 1
which can be substituted into equation (5) to
Now, by substituting for m t+1 and r t+1 from equations (3), (6), and (8) we get
where we use the normal distribution assumption for ε t+1 to evaluate the expectation in the second line of (10). Since the yield i t (2) is given by ) log( 5 . 0
we have that:
which is the linear form of (9), with the response coefficient for the two period yield given by:
A similar result holds for all maturities, as shown in Appendix A. The response coefficient on the current inflation rate for yields to maturity of n periods is:
Observe that the numerator of equation (13) (14) holds, then the common ratio of terms in the geometric series in the numerator of equation (13) is less than one. For each
increase in maturity n, we calculate b n by (i) adding a term in the numerator which is less than the previous term and (ii) adding a term in the denominator greater than the previous term. Thus we conclude that b n cannot increase geometrically. Note, however, that while the estimated response coefficients do not explode, they do not significantly decline. This implies that inequality (14) is nearly an equality.
The close connection between condition (14) and the Taylor principle is important because the latter is usually viewed as the sine qua non of a good monetary policy. If that principle does not hold (as appears to have been the case in the first sub-sample 1960Q1 -1979Q4 in Section 1), then the model is not even stable, which is one way to understand why that period showed such macroeconomic turbulence; but it is possible for (14) to hold if γ 1 is negative which causes longer-term yields to have a more muted response to inflation. If the Taylor principle holds, it is possible that (14) does not hold if γ 1 is sufficiently large and positive.
In the case of no risk aversion (γ 1 = 0), the Taylor principle and condition (14) are exactly the same. We note that Ang and Piazzesi (2003) and Ang, Dong, and Piazzesi (2005) estimated the time-varying risk parameter corresponding to inflation to be positive, though in somewhat different set-ups.
Impact of Shifts in the Monetary Policy Rule
As shown in Section 1, policy actions have gotten more aggressive in responding to inflation; that is, δ in equation (3) has increased. The question we focus on now is whether that increase may have affected the behavior of the whole term structure. In other words, can such a shift in the response coefficients in the policy rule explain the shift in the response coefficients of longer term interest rates? First, recall equation (12) for the n = 2 bond yield:
.
One can easily see that the response coefficient in the policy rule has a direct impact on the response of this longer-term yield to inflation. However, there are countervailing effects. A larger reaction coefficient δ means that expected future short-term interest rates will rise by a larger amount when future inflation rises; this effect is measured by the presence of δ outside the parentheses in (12) and it depends on the risk premium parameter γ 1 ; but a higher δ also means that inflation is expected to increase by a smaller amount in the future for a given increase in inflation today, because the persistence in inflation declines; this effect is measured by the term
To sort out these countervailing effects, consider the derivative of (12) with respect to δ:
Note that unless δ is already very large, the derivative is likely to be positive and we will generally make this assumption, as indicated by the inequality sign in (15). Then increasing δ will raise the reaction of the 2-period rate to inflation. Here, the reduced persistence has less effect than the size of the reaction. For high values of δ the derivative could be negative, reflecting that reduced persistence has a larger effect. Now consider the general case of maturity n and differentiate equation (13) with respect to δ. As shown in Appendix A, the derivative for n = 2, 3,…,N is: while the second term, which is subtracted from the first, is an arithmetic-geometric sum with the same common factor. Much as in equation (15), there are two countervailing effects: the first term is the direct effect of policy while the second term is the indirect persistence effect.
Figure 3 depicts these two terms as functions of the maturity length n and for some example parameter values. Note how the curves cross at a particular maturity, which we call n*.
The derivative is the difference between the two curves, shown by the distance between them in Figure 3 . For all n < n*, the first term is larger so equation (16) but the second term is larger starting at n* so that equation (16) (14) and (15) Proof: First, multiply equation (16) by n and consider the two resulting series which we denote as: 
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We next consider maturities longer than n = 2 and define ) 1 ( ) ( ) (
which are simply the terms in the two sums and are given by Now consider n = 3 < .
n We know that:
Similarly, using induction on n for all , n n < ( ) ( )
Finally, we let n approach infinity, and use the formula for the limits of a geometric and arithmetic-geometric series to compute that: 
for n sufficiently large, and
and for all , n n > So there must be a single point at which these two curves cross, given by n*. Thus we have proved that . for 0 and * all for 0
We illustrate the proof in Figure 4 . , respectively. Note that the number n lies at the point where these two slopes are equal. The proof first considers values of n greater than 2 but to the left of n and then goes on to consider values of n to the right of n . In the first region
and, as n increases, a smaller term is added to the smaller sum than to the larger sum. In the second region, which begins with a value of n where
there is a single crossing point n* at which the two curves are shown to intersect.
We feel that the assumptions underlying Proposition 1 are empirically realistic. It is reasonable to assume that (14) holds because the estimated response coefficients in Section 1 do not explode. Condition (15) holds unless δ is extremely large. The assumption of a positive 1 γ falls in line with previous empirical estimates, and even if it is not positive and thus n * is infinite, this does not contradict our empirical findings. Hence, the model does explain the facts: a monetary policy that reacts more aggressively against inflation implies that bond yields respond more aggressively to inflation.
Recall that the regressions reported in Section 1 went out to a five-year or twenty-quarter maturity. These regressions showed no indication that the response coefficients declined with the large increase in the policy response parameter δ we saw in the two sub-samples. This suggests that all these maturity lengths are less than n*. It would be interesting to see if the sign reversed for longer maturity U.S. zero-coupon Treasuries, as well as for zero-coupon bond issued by other countries.
A Model with Both Inflation and Output in the Policy Rules
Now, consider the following model which includes real output as well as inflation.
Equation (17) is the policy rule; it replaces the simpler policy rule of equation (3), incorporating a measure of the real output gap in the interest rate rule of the central bank. We specify bond prices analogous to (6), but the pricing kernel m t+1 now has the matrix form shown in equation (18) . Equation (19) shows how inflation and real output affect risk aversion in the pricing kernel, a generalization of equation (7). The risk term t λ is now two-dimensional. The first element corresponds to the risk term associated with real output, whereas the second element corresponds to the risk term associated with inflation. Equations (20) and (21) replace equation (8). Equation with the n-period yield intercept term given by a n and the n-period response coefficient vector given by . (25) which includes real output and equation (11) which does not. In both equations the policy parameters affect the coefficient in predictable ways.
More generally (see Appendix B), the n-maturity bond yield response coefficient vector is:
which an obvious generalization of equation (13).
Impacts of Shifts in the Policy Rule on the Term Structure Response Coefficients
In our simple, univariate model, we saw that the inflation response coefficient in the simple policy rule had a direct impact on the response of longer-term yields to inflation, yet the direction of the reaction had two countervailing forces. We can also examine how longer-term yields are impacted by the policy reaction coefficients in this two-dimensional model. Empirical estimates of monetary policy rules have shown that both δ y and δ π significantly increased in the 1980s, and our regressions from Section 1 indicate that when output and inflation are both used as factors determining bond yields, more aggressive policy is associated with substantial increases in bond yield reaction coefficients. We want to see how such a policy change might impact the response coefficients of the output gap and inflation for bond yields in our analytical model, in order to reconcile the observed empirics. To simplify the analytics we set Expanding the coefficient vector we derived for the two-period yield in (27) gives: The first element of each of these expressions corresponds to the real output gap coefficient in the bond yield equation (22), and the second element of each of these expressions corresponds to the inflation coefficient.
If we examine the element b 2,2 corresponding to inflation, we see that ( ) . Observe that this derivative is very similar to (16); we again have countervailing forces at work.
We have two sums, one is geometric and the other is arithmetic-geometric. The geometric term represents the direct effect of policy, while the arithmetic-geometric term is a combination of the persistence of inflation and the output gap. And as in the simpler case we can calculate how the response coefficients for the longer yields are affected by the policy response coefficients. 
First, notice how the output gap coefficients decline much more rapidly than the inflation coefficients, much as in the empirical estimates. This is due to the persistence of output being smaller than the persistence of inflation, a common stylized fact we see in the data. Even more intriguing, however, is how the slope of the response coefficient curves change as the policy parameters change. As the monetary policy rule becomes more responsive, shorter-term yields respond more than longer-term yields to both the output gap and inflation. This is the coutervailing forces at work; as the indirect persistence effect grows larger than the direct effect of higher policy reaction coefficients, the bond yield response coefficients change and longerterm response coefficients adjust downward.
An Explanation of the Term Structure Conundrum
The above results also shed light on a famous asset pricing puzzle which first arose when the Federal Reserve started raising the Federal Funds rate in 2004. That increase in the shortterm interest rate was not associated with nearly as large an increase in long-term interest rates as would have been expected based on experience over the previous 20 years. The puzzle was coined the "conundrum" by former Federal Reserve Chairman Alan Greenspan; it was a great concern for policymakers for it appeared that the tightening of monetary policy would not have had the bite that it had in previous periods of tightening. There have been many explanations for the conundrum, including the idea of a global saving glut that drove down the world real interest rate. But that explanation has been challenged because world saving as a share of world GDP had actually fallen during this period. we also included an additive dummy along with the multiplicative dummy to the regression; we still found a significant downward shift in the inflation response. We note that Davig and Leeper (2006) found a similar shift using an estimated Markov switching model. Now, according to the theory presented in this paper, a perception of a smaller response coefficient in the policy rule could well have led market participants to expect smaller interest rate responses to inflation in the future, and therefore lower long term interest rate responses.
That is, we would predict that the lower response δ π would have lowered the response coefficient b 2,n for inflation. Hence, our model provides a simple consistent explanation for the conundrum.
While the regime shift was clearly temporary when viewed from the perspective of today, it would have been difficult to assess at the time whether the Federal Reserve would have returned to the typical rule followed during the post 1984Q1 period.
Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown that the theory of monetary policy rules helps explain and understand the dramatic changes in the comovement of note and bond yields and macroeconomic variables over the past several decades. We showed that a more aggressive policy regime has a substantial impact on the entire term structure of interest rates: a more responsive monetary policy increases the response of longer-term yields to macroeconomic variables. Our model also helps explain the behavior of the longer-term interest rates during the recent spell in 2002 -2005 , where standard models predicted that longer-term yields would increase far more than they did.
There are several directions that future research might take. Using models of stochastic regime shifting, such as Davig and Leeper (2007) , along with no-arbitrage restrictions may help pin down the exact patterns of bond yields and macroeconomic variables. Including longer-term interest rates directly in the macro model would be an important check for robustness. Applying the model to policy changes in other countries-even more dramatic changes than studied herewould also be valuable. For example, do we see the same shift in the reaction coefficients for Brazil when comparing the 1980s and 1990s to the 2000s? All of these topics are worth pursuing and will help shed light upon how the decisions of monetary policymakers at the short end of the yield curve affect behavior at the long end.
Derivation of the Relationship between the Policy Rule and Response Coefficients
We use the method of undetermined coefficients, and begin by conjecturing that the nperiod bond prices have the following form:
The continuously-compounded yields on n-period bonds are then: Using the same approach we used for the case of n=2 in the text we have: Consider the first few elements and ignoring n: Tables C1, C2, C3 and C4 contain additional details about the regressions reported in Tables 1,   2 , 3, and 4, respectively. Under each point estimate, the standard error is reported in parenthesis.
We also report the R 2 for each regression. 
